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THREE VERSIONS OF NONSENSE
PAUL CAMPOS*

Larry Alexander's interesting and provocative paper raises all sorts
of important questions, of which I have time here to address only one, or
rather two aspects of one: is his claim that the modem American university is in something of an intellectual crisis true, and, if so, is his diagnosis as to why correct?1
Alexander's claim, briefly stated, is that many of the things that
pass for knowledge in the modem university are nothing more than nonsense. This is a judgment with which I heartily concur. We disagree,
however, as to why this is the case. Alexander's argument is that postmodernism, at least in its cruder and more extreme forms, has enabled all
sorts of absurdities in the name of perspectivalism, historicism, antifoundationalism, social constructionism, etcetera. Again, I do not disagree. However, Alexander's argument, I think, implies that postmodernism is nothing more than a bastard child of Enlightenment rationality, and that if we wish to restore the university to true intellectual
health, we need merely look to those disciplines that have remained the
legitimate heirs of the Enlightenment: namely, the hard sciences, medicine, philosophy, economics, and, at least to some extent, law.
My objection to Alexander's argument is not that his scorched earth
critique goes too far but rather that it does not go nearly far enough.
Consider three ideas that at present have impeccable intellectual credentials in the modem university and that remain wholly uncontaminated by
post-modem thought: one, the position within the philosophy of mind
known as eliminative materialism; two, the jurisprudential claim that legal texts have meanings other than those ascribed to them by their authors; and, three, the epidemiological claim that, in the words of Harvard
Medical School professors Walter Willett and Meir Stampfer, having a
body mass index ("BMI") of between 25 and 29.9 is "a major contributor
2
to morbidity and mortality."
Eliminative materialism, at least in some of its most famous and
academically respectable forms, such as in the work of Paul and Patricia
Churchland, is the claim that consciousness does not exist, and that the
*
Professor of Law, University of Colorado.
1. Larry Alexander, Academic Freedom, 77 U. COLO. L. REv. 883 (2006).
2.
Walter Willett & Meir Stampfer, Letter, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 17, 2003, at 4. The
Body Mass Index places people of different heights and weights on a single linear scale.
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concept of consciousness itself will be eliminated as neuroscience advances. 3 On this view, a comprehensive description of the workings of
the human brain will find no place for any such concept as "mind," and,
therefore, concepts such as "intention," "belief," "desire," and so forth,
which make sense only if one assumes the existence of conscious entities, are referring to illusions rather than actual phenomena because no
such entities exist. In short, this version of the philosophy of mind argues that the traditional subject matter of the discipline-that is, the
mind-is not a real thing, but rather a category mistake. It is a product
of folk psychology that must and will be discarded as knowledge advances toward a strictly materialist and therefore "scientific" account of
reality.
The claim that texts have meanings which remain autonomous from
those meanings the texts' authors intended them to have is of course crucial to much legal argument, from the interpretive textualism advocated
by eminent jurists such as Antonin Scalia and Frank Easterbrook, to fundamental legal doctrines such as the parol evidence rule.4 This claim depends on the acceptance of some version of the distinction made in
speech act theory between sentence meaning and utterance meaning; that
is, between the formal, acontextual linguistic meaning of a text, and the
meanings the text may have in a variety of linguistic contexts. "Thus,"
to quote Justice Holmes' description of the proper method for interpreting a statute, "we ask not what this man meant, but what those words
would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of English, using them in
'5
the circumstances in which they were used."
The claim that having a BMI of between 25 and 29.9 is a major contributor to morbidity and mortality means that, according to the advocates of this view, the epidemiological evidence is clear that, for example, an average height woman has a significantly increased risk of
premature death as a direct causal result of maintaining a weight of between 146 and 174 pounds, rather than a weight of between, to use Professors Willet and Stampfer's definition of ideal body mass, 108 and 127
6
pounds.
All three of these claims are, I repeat, eminently respectable positions within the modem university. The Churchlands are celebrated phi3.
See generally PAUL CHURCHLAND, MATTER AND CONSCIOUSNESS (2d ed. 1988).
4.
For Scalia's views on the subject of textualism, see generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1998). A good summary of Easterbrook's position is found in
In re Sinclair,870 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1989).
5.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417,
417-18 (1898).
6.
See Paul F. Campos et al., The Epidemiology of Overweight and Obesity: Public
Health Crisis or Moral Panic?,35 INT'L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 55 (2006).
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losophers, to the extent that philosophers can be celebrated. Justice
Scalia, the most prominent proponent of the idea of the autonomous legal
text, is widely regarded to be the most intellectually influential member
of the current Supreme Court. Walter Willett is perhaps the single most
quoted authority in the elite media on the question of the relationship between weight and health, as well as being the chair of a department
within America's most prestigious medical school.
Yet all these claims are nonsense. They are not "insufficiently nuanced" or "true" in some Clintonian sense that depends on what the
meaning of the word "nonsense" is. They are completely, egregiously,
and absurdly false. The claim that there is no such thing as consciousness, no matter how erudite and analytically rigorous the arguments one
may make for it are, simply remains insane on its face. It is the sort of
thing that only academics could believe, or rather claim to believe, or
rather imagine they believe; for if we accept eliminative materialism,
then the statement "Paul and Patricia Churchland believe in the truth of
eliminative materialism" is, ex hypothesi, an oxymoron because the
Churchlands, like everybody else, have no beliefs. I believe that Larry
Alexander will fail if he sets out on a quest to find an identifiably postmodem school of thought that is more absurd than eliminative materialism, since eliminative materialism-which, I repeat, is an eminently respectable view within philosophy departments that have remained wholly
untouched by post-modernism-is about as absurd an intellectual position as can be imagined.
The assertion that a text can mean something other than what its author intends it to mean is based on a theoretical distinction between what
language means acontextually, and what it means contextually. The
problem with this distinction is that it is just as absurd as eliminative materialism. Language does not mean anything acontextually, because the
notion of an acontextual language is just as oxymoronic as the notion of
a non-mental consciousness. In other words, the distinction between sentence meaning and utterance meaning is empty, because there is no such
thing as sentence meaning. 7 The meaning of a sentence emptied of its
context of utterance is no more cogent than the idea of pain in the abstract. There is no such thing as pain in the abstract, and there is no such
thing as semantic meaning in the abstract. Pain is always felt by a particular subject, and meaning is always meant by a particular subject.

7.
For an extensive discussion of these points, see Paul F. Campos, The Chaotic Pseudotext, 94 MICH. L. REv. 2178 (1996) (arguing that since the meaning of a text and the semantic intentions of the text authors are simply the same thing, any account of interpretation that
attempts to separate these concepts is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of textual interpretation).
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Both phenomena require, always and everywhere, as Larry Alexander's
8
favorite post-modernist would say, a subject who feels and means.
The claim that average height women who weigh between 146 and
174 pounds run a significantly increased risk of premature death as a result of their supposedly overweight status is as demonstrably false as any
broad empirical generalization can be. Such levels of body mass do not
even correlate with increased mortality risk, let alone cause it. The claim
that so-called "overweight" is a significant contributor to mortality has
exactly the same status as the claim that smoking marijuana leads to a
significant risk of dying from an overdose of THC. That is, while it is
impossible to demonstrate that evidence for this proposition will not appear at some point in the future, at present, there is no evidence in its favor and an enormous amount of evidence for the contrary claim.
How do claims that run the gamut from demonstrably false empirical assertions to completely incredible conceptual theories get people
tenure at Harvard Medical School or seats on the Supreme Court or, even
more annoyingly, well-funded academic chairs in lovely La Jolla, California? I would suggest that, in each of these cases, intellectual perspectives that can be characterized as "post-modem" to some extent provide
helpful clues. That is because each of these absurd claims is a product of
certain dysfunctional features of the social construction of knowledge in
this particular culture. Eliminative materialism is nothing more than the
logical endpoint of certain metaphysical axioms that dominate disciplines
such as contemporary analytic philosophy. If one takes the view that, as
John Searle puts it, the universe is ultimately nothing but particles in
fields of force and these phenomena are themselves subject to mindless
laws of causality, 9 then it is difficult to escape the conclusion that consciousness and everything associated with it is epiphenomenal at best, if
not a complete illusion. If one wants to preserve the notion that there is
something called "law" that remains autonomous from the beliefs of legal actors, then one must posit, among other things, texts that have
autonomous meanings. If one wants to convince public health officials
that the extremely complex and ambiguous data produced by a field like
epidemiology provides a solid basis for a wide variety of public health
policies, one will have to pretend to know much more than what one actually knows-which is the intellectual vice par excellence of postEnlightenment thought in general, and the contemporary university in
particular.
8.
On the claim that interpretation always and everywhere requires an interpreter who
undertakes interpretation within a particular social context, see STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A
TEXT IN THIS CLASS? (1980).
9.
See JOHN SEARLE, THE REDISCOVERY OF THE MIND (1992).
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In short, the absurdities of eliminative materialism, autonomous textual meaning, and the so-called "obesity epidemic" are products of different aspects of the failures of the more extreme forms of Enlightenment
rationalism. To explain adequately why Paul and Patricia Churchland
are famous, one would need to understand why, in this intellectual culture at this time, basing arguments on the assumption of the existence of
a transcendent metaphysical reality is considered disreputable, while basing arguments on the assumption that human beings are actually zombies
is considered a plausible basis for an entire school of philosophical
thought. To fully understand why it has become the official position of
the American public health establishment that the average American's
weight is now a hazard to his or her health, it would be necessary to undertake, among other things, a careful ethnography of the Harvard Medical School, in order to explain how a few high-status academics have
managed to transmute their own eating disordered ideation into national
health policy. To comprehend how what is called "the rule of law" has
come to feature a belief that texts can somehow contain meanings independent of particular human beings' beliefs, it would be necessary to explore how law in our culture has become a kind of idolatrous, pseudo10
theological discours.
Thus, while I agree with Alexander that there is something fundamentally wrong with many aspects of the intellectual culture of the contemporary university, I believe that the excesses of post-modernism are
symptoms of the illness rather than its cause. The true cause of that illness is the largely unthinking acceptance of various metaphysical axioms. The nihilistic aspects of post-modernism are inevitable consequences of taking those axioms seriously. Indeed, those axioms make
nonsense of, among many other things, the entire concept of human freedom, whether academic or otherwise.

10.
This last point is elucidated in an excellent new book, STEVEN SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY (2004).
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